February 22, 2017

Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV. Designing Mechanisms by Andrew Byde (auth.), Julian Padget, Onn Shehory, David

By Andrew Byde (auth.), Julian Padget, Onn Shehory, David Parkes, Norman Sadeh, William E. Walsh (eds.)

This e-book constitutes the completely refereed post-proceedings of the 4th overseas Workshop on Agent-Mediated digital trade, AMEC 2002, held in Bologna, Italy in July 2002 through the AAMAS 2002 conference.

The 20 revised complete papers provided including an introductory survey by means of the quantity editors have been rigorously chosen and superior in the course of rounds of reviewing and revision. The ebook offers a different evaluate of the state-of-the-art of designing mechanisms and platforms for agent-mediated e-commerce- The papers are prepared in topical sections on digital auctions, negotiations, and digital markets.

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Extra info for Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV. Designing Mechanisms and Systems: AAMAS 2002 Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce Bologna, Italy, July 16, 2002 Revised Papers

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Because the search proceeds best-first, (2, 1, 1) will be expanded next. Only two more queries are necessary: bidder 1 is asked for the bundle at rank 3 (the answer is A, which renders the considered combination (3, 1, 1) feasible) and bidder 1 is asked again, if the value of the bundle represented by the currently considered rank (now rank 3) is 2 or more less than the value of the most preferred bundle. Again, the answer is “No”. 7 In total, the following information is revealed (to the auctioneer): v1 (rank1) = v1 (rank2) + 1 = v1 (rank3) v2 (rank1) v2 (rank2) + 2 v3 (rank1) v3 (rank2) + 2 This can also be summarized as follows: Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3 A (x1 − 1) (x2 − 2) (x3 − 2) B (x1 − 1) x2 (x3 − 2) C x1 0 (x2 − 2) 0 x3 0 The efficient allocation is determined to be A !

The lowest-cost complete, feasible combination for these three tasks is Bids 1, 2, and 5. The winner determination problem for combinatorial auctions has been shown to be N P-complete and inapproximable [16]. This result clearly applies 20 J. Collins, G. Demir, and M. Gini Masonry Carpentry Roofing RFQ 0 1 2 3 4 5 week Bid1 Masonry: 500$ Bid2 Carpentry: 800$ Bid3 Roofing: 750$ Bid4 Carpentry: 1000$ Bid5 Roofing: 900$ Fig. 1. Bid Example to the MAGNET winner determination problem, since we simply apply an additional set of (temporal) constraints to the basic combinatorial auction problem, and we don t allow free disposal.

We develop a differential-elicitation algorithm that finds the efficient allocation of items to the bidders, and as a side-effect, the Vickrey payments (which make truthful bidding incentive compatible). We also present two auction mechanisms that use differential elicitation: the difference mechanism and the difference increment mechanism. 1 Introduction Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling m items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders’ valuations on bundles exhibit complementarity (a bundle of items is worth more than the sum of its parts) and/or substitutability (a bundle is worth less than the sum of its parts).

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